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There were several reports the government attempted to commit
arbitrary or unlawful killings within the country and abroad. The
government typically investigated SSF killings within the country and
prosecuted perpetrators. The government investigated sporadic grenade
attacks and a spate of machete killings across the country and continued
to prosecute individuals who threatened or harmed genocide survivors
and witnesses.
On October 15, Mozambique police found former Rwandan Development
Board Managing Director Theogene Turatsinze floating dead and tied with
ropes in a lake two days after he was reported missing. Mozambique
police initially indicated Rwandan government involvement in the killing
before contacting the government and changing its characterization to a
common crime. Rwandan government officials publicly condemned the
killing and denied involvement. Domestic political observers commented
that Turatsinze had access to politically sensitive financial
information related to certain Rwandan government insiders. The killing
remained unsolved at year’s end.

In a June 27 addendum to its interim report, in its November 15 final
report, and in a November 26 letter to the UN Security Council, the UN
Group of Experts (UNGOE) accused the government of violating UN arms
embargo and sanctions regimes through “direct military support” and “the
provision of material and financial support to armed groups operating
in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Specifically, the UNGOE
claimed the government provided weapons and ammunition, recruits,
intelligence, political and financial support, logistics, and direct
Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) military interventions in support of the M23
armed group rebellion in the eastern DRC, which began in April. The
UNGOE asserted the de facto chain of command of the M23 started with
Rwandan Minister of Defense General James Kabarebe and included
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense General Jacques Nziza.
The government strenuously disputed the credibility of the UNGOE report
and consistently denied providing any support to the M23. Human Rights
Watch (HRW) and other international experts also provided evidence in
support of the claim of government assistance to the M23. In press
releases dated June 3, September 11, November 8, 16, and 20, and
December 28, HRW accused the M23 of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of
life, including the summary execution of at least 33 recruits, among
other abuses. The UNGOE echoed such claims, alleging the M23 and RDF
troops killed dozens of recruits and prisoners of war through summary
executions, beatings, starvation, or by burying them alive. Fourteen
international NGOs, including Global Witness, Freedom House, and The
Enough Project, published an open letter on December 10 criticizing
Rwanda’s support for the M23 armed group. Several of those NGOs also
produced their own reports and press releases detailing human rights
abuses by the M23. In addition to the M23, the UNGOE alleged the Rwandan
government provided material and financial support to several other
armed groups operating in the DRC, including Raia Mutomboki, the
Congolese Defense Forces, and the Patriotic Resistance Forces of Ituri,
among others. The UNGOE had charged each of those groups, but especially
Raia Mutomboki, with committing extrajudicial killings and other human
rights abuses.
Laurent Nkunda, the former leader of the Congolese armed group
National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), which was
reported to have received support from the Rwandan government, remained
under house arrest without charges. During the year, elements of the
CNDP reconstituted themselves as the M23 armed group. Nkunda was
arrested in 2009 by the RDF when he returned to the country reportedly
for consultations with government officials. The Rwandan government has
not acted on the DRC’s 2009 extradition request for Nkunda.

In September 2011 security personnel shot and injured opposition
party PS-Imberakuri member Eric Nshimyumuremyi, allegedly because he was
armed and seeking a fight. A PS-Imberakuri spokesperson claimed
Nshimyumuremyi was not armed and was shot because he was a party member.
The Rwanda National Police (RNP) defended SSF action and did not
discipline those involved. Prosecutors charged Nshimyumuremyi with
illegal possession of weapons, and his trial continued at year’s end.
In December 2011 an unidentified gunman killed Charles Ingabire, a
Rwandan journalist and government critic, in Kampala, Uganda. Both the
press and human rights organizations reported Ingabire had survived an
earlier attack in September 2011. Rwandan authorities alleged he had
embezzled from a microfinance company, orphans, and a genocide
survivors’ organization and was probably killed for that reason.
Five grenade attacks in January and March in Kigali’s Muhanga
District and Musanze District resulted in three deaths and injuries to
37 persons. Police arrested several suspects associated with the
attacks, which were widely believed to have been orchestrated by the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group
operating mainly in the eastern DRC. On January 13, judges convicted 21
defendants and acquitted eight in relation to several 2011 and earlier
grenade attacks. Prosecutors earlier dropped charges against more than
70 others. Of the 29 defendants tried in court, only four had lawyers,
and several maintained SSF members had tortured them into signing false
confessions. Judges placed the onus of proving torture on the defendants
and refused to examine defendants’ claims absent a medical report;
however, Amnesty International and HRW claimed the defendants had no
access to doctors during their time in detention at Kami military
intelligence camp and that such medical examinations could not be
obtained without endangering the doctor. Several appeals continued at
year’s end.
On December 6, the High Court in Musanze District convicted 11 of 12
defendants for threatening state security in relation to 2011 and
earlier grenade attacks and other “terrorist acts.” According to HRW,
many of the defendants had disappeared in 2011, and the majority claimed
in open court they had been tortured and forced into confessing during
illegal detentions at Mukamira military camp. The criminal trial of an
additional 18 SSF defendants began on December 12. An observer of the
trial told HRW the majority of the defendants testified by year’s end
and claimed to have been arrested between 2010 and 2011, illegally
detained at Mukamira military camp, and tortured.

According to HRW, another state security trial began in December,
including defendants charged with the early 2012 grenade attacks. In
addition HRW reported at least three persons who disappeared in
September 2011 and were illegally detained at Kami military intelligence
camp until transfer to Kicukiro prison in December 2011 have been
scheduled to go on trial in a group of 10 defendants in February 2013
for threatening state security and collaborating with the FDLR.
On December 20, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), based in Tanzania, convicted Augustin Ngirabatware, the
country’s former minister of planning, of genocide and crimes against
humanity. The court sentenced Ngirabatware to 35 years in prison.
Ngirabatware was found to have distributed weapons at checkpoints where
Hutu militias would kill ethnic Tutsis during the 1994 genocide.
Ngirabatware’s trial was the last genocide case tried by the ICTR.
Police arrested 14 individuals in connection with numerous machete
killings between July and September. Assailants tortured and killed at
least 15 prostitutes in Kigali, while small groups indiscriminately
slaughtered more than a dozen prostitutes in Muhanga District and
Musanze District. According to the Association for the Defense of Human
Rights (ARDHO), which received death threats for investigating the
Muhanga killings, citizens were afraid to speak with authorities because
the assailants attacked witnesses who provided information. Some
witnesses, human rights activists, and government officials expressed
fear the machete killings were a terrorist campaign instigated by the
FDLR.
The government investigated and prosecuted individuals accused of
threatening or harming genocide survivors and witnesses or of espousing
genocide ideology, which the law defines as dehumanizing an individual
or a group with the same characteristics by threatening, intimidating,
defaming, inciting hatred, negating the genocide, taking revenge,
altering testimony or evidence, killing, planning to kill, or attempting
to kill someone. From January to September, a special protection bureau
in the Office of the National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA)
registered 167 cases of genocide ideology, of which 64 were filed in
court, 31 were dismissed, 10 were reclassified, and 62 were pending
investigation. From January to September, the courts adjudicated 59
cases (63 individuals), convicting 52 and acquitting 11 (see section
1.e.). Police investigated six murders of genocide survivors. No
information was available regarding charges filed, but according to the
genocide survivors’ association Ibuka, police arrested suspects in all
six cases. On October 1, in Kigali, genocide survivor Alex Rutindura,
who media reported was involved in a court case over his parents’ land,
survived a machete attack by six assailants, the third attempt on his
life in two years.

There were fewer reports of disappearances and politically motivated
abductions or kidnappings than in previous years, but local human rights
organizations ceased investigating disappearances during the year after
reporting pressure from government officials, including threats and
allegations of treason. Amnesty International, the Rwandan League for
the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR), and other
observers alleged SSF, including the RDF J-2 Military Intelligence
Directorate, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), and
the RNP’s Department of Intelligence, orchestrated the disappearances.
The government occasionally made efforts to investigate occurrences but
did not punish any perpetrators.
On September 5, unknown persons abducted Alexis Bakunzibake, vice
president of the unregistered faction of PS-Imberakuri, from a bus
station in Kigali. Two days later Bakunzibake reappeared across the
border in Uganda, claiming his kidnappers interrogated him about
PS-Imberakuri’s plans to register and compete in the 2013 parliamentary
elections, its funding sources and supporters, and his conversations
with HRW, Amnesty International, and foreign diplomats. Bakunzibake
further alleged his kidnappers bound and blindfolded him before staging a
mock execution and then warned him to get out of politics. Bakunzibake
and other PS-Imberakuri members fled the country soon thereafter. The
RNP did not launch an investigation into the incident, claiming
Bakunzibake did not file a formal complaint in person.

The constitution and law prohibit such practices, and there were
fewer reports of abuse of detainees and prisoners by military and NISS
officials than in 2011; however, reports of abuse by police intelligence
officials increased. Authorities dismissed or disciplined some police
officers for use of excessive force and other abuses during the year.
Police investigations led to formal criminal charges filed in court in
more serious cases.
On May 2, the government signed into law a new penal code that
upgrades torture from an aggravating circumstance to a crime in itself.
The new law mandates the maximum penalty, defined by extent of injury,
for SSF and other government perpetrators.

There were numerous new reports during the year of detainee abuse and
lengthy illegal detention by police intelligence at Kwa Gacinya
detention center in Kigali, despite government assertions the center had
been closed. Former detainees told HRW they were detained in isolation
and repeatedly beaten by police intelligence with plastic batons or bare
hands to secure information and force confessions. Between May and
August, police arrested at least 15 persons in connection with an
electronics theft ring in Kigali. According to HRW, several of the
defendants told the judge during a September pretrial detention hearing
police had illegally detained and beaten them into forced confessions,
but the judge accepted the prosecution’s argument, based on precedent
set by the 2011 “grenade case,” that illegal detention could be
excusable by investigative prerogative and that claims of torture and
abuse could not be examined without a medical report.
Amnesty International reports published in April and October
documented 18 allegations of torture and other cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by military intelligence
and other SSF personnel in 2010 and 2011 to secure information or force
confessions at Kami military intelligence camp, Ministry of Defense
(MINADEF) headquarters, Mukamira military camp, and safe houses. Former
detainees repeatedly alleged to Amnesty International, HRW, and
LIPRODHOR they endured sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation,
starvation, extraction of fingernails, electrocution, scalding, melting
of plastic bags over the head, suffocation, burning or branding,
beating, and simulated drowning through confinement in cisterns filled
with rain water. Local and international human rights organizations
reported the RDF took positive steps during the year to reform military
interrogation methods and detention standards, resulting in fewer
reports of torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or
punishment at Kami and other military detention facilities; however,
they cautioned the increased use of safe houses by NISS, RDF J-2, and
RNP Intelligence made monitoring more difficult.

In addition to torture, former detainees repeatedly alleged to
Amnesty International, HRW, and LIPRODHOR that, while in military
intelligence detention in 2010 and 2011 at Kami, they had been held in
solitary confinement, without light and without communication with the
outside world, they were allowed only two bathroom visits per day, they
had to eat next to their feces, and they were sometimes told the food
was poisoned. RDF reforms led to a reduction in such reports during the
year, according to local and international human rights organizations,
but the increased use of safe houses complicated monitoring efforts.

Prison and detention center conditions were harsh, although the
government made numerous improvements during the year. Police sometimes
beat newly arrested suspects to obtain confessions. There were numerous
reports of detainee abuse and lengthy illegal detention by police
intelligence at Kwa Gacinya detention center in Kigali. There were
reports that J-2 military intelligence personnel employed torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment to obtain
confessions in military detention centers, although less frequently than
in the previous year (see section 1.c). The SSF increasingly used safe
houses to detain and interrogate “security” detainees and military
officials accused of insubordination. The government selectively
permitted visits by independent human rights observers.

Physical Conditions: At year’s end the prison population was
55,618, over 90 percent of whom were men. A total of 333 prisoners were
juveniles. The system was designed for 54,700. Men and women were held
separately in similar conditions, although overcrowding was more
prevalent in male wards. Fewer than 100 children under the age of three
lived with their parents in prison. The Rwanda Correctional Services
(RCS) provided five nursery schools, one psychosocial center, and fresh
milk for such children. All juveniles were held at Nyagatare
Rehabilitation Center or in special wings of regular prisons. There were
no reports of abuse of juveniles, and the RCS continued to improve
access to lawyers, education, and job training for juveniles.
Individuals convicted of genocide-related offenses comprised a majority
of the adult prison population. Authorities generally separated pretrial
detainees from convicted prisoners; however, there were numerous
exceptions due to the large number of detainees awaiting trial.
The government continued to hold eight prisoners of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone in a purpose-built detention center, which the UN
deemed met international standards for incarceration of prisoners
convicted by international criminal tribunals. The government held
international transfers and some high-profile “security” prisoners in
similarly upgraded maximum security wings of Kigali Central “1930”
Prison.
Unlike in the previous year, there were no prison riots. A riot at
Huye Prison in July 2011 resulted in the deaths of five prisoners, who
reportedly were shot by guards.
Prisoner deaths resulted from anemia, HIV/AIDS, respiratory diseases,
malaria, and other diseases at rates similar to those found in the
general population. Medical care in prisons was commensurate with care
for the public at large. The government enrolled all prisoners in the
national health insurance plan. Prisoners had access to potable water.
The Ministry of Internal Security (MININTER) implemented a 2011
directive taking full responsibility to provide food for prisoners
through contracted cafeteria services, canteens, and prison gardens.
Family members were permitted to supplement the diets of vulnerable
prisoners with health issues. Ventilation and temperature conditions
improved as overcrowding continued to decline. According to the RCS,
each prison had dormitories, toilets, sports facilities, a health
center, a guest hall, a kitchen, water, and electricity, as required by a
2006 presidential order governing prison conditions.

Conditions in police and military detention centers varied.
Overcrowding was common in police detention centers, and poor
ventilation often led to high temperatures. Provision of food and
medical care was inconsistent, and some detainees claimed to have gone
for several days without food. There were complaints regarding
inadequate sanitation in some detention centers, and not all detention
centers had toilets. There were numerous reports of substandard
conditions for civilians held in military detention centers.
Gikondo Transit Center, where Kigali authorities held street
children, vagrants, suspected prostitutes, and street sellers, continued
to operate despite a Senate committee’s 2008 call for its closure due
to substandard conditions (see section 1.d.). Two other transit centers,
where conditions generally met basic international standards, operated
under the management of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
(MIGEPROF), as did one transit center under church management. Hundreds
of male transit center detainees and at-risk youth between the ages of
18 and 35 were transferred to the Iwawa Rehabilitation and Vocational
Development Center on Iwawa Island, where substandard sanitation and
nutrition resulted in disease outbreaks and several deaths. During the
year there were reports of individuals drowning while attempting to
escape. There were also reports the RDF recruited individuals from Iwawa
to join the M23 armed group in the DRC (see sections 1.a. and 6,
children.).
Administration: Recordkeeping on prisoners and detainees
remained inadequate, but authorities took steps to transfer paper files
to an electronic database. Domestic and international human rights
organizations reported numerous instances of long delays and failures to
locate prisoners and detainees. There were reports of forgotten
detainees and of prisoners who remained incarcerated beyond their
release date due to misplaced records. The RCS provided additional
training to its staff on the shift from penal to rehabilitative
detention as it coped with the July 2011 merger of the National Prisons
Service and the Works for General Interest (TIG) community service
program for perpetrators of the genocide. The Nyagatare Rehabilitation
Center for juveniles continued renovations with the assistance of the
Dignity in Detention Foundation and UNICEF to align with rehabilitative
priorities. In May the government amended the penal code to allow
community service as alternative sentencing for misdemeanors and petty
offenses, and the Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST) instructed judges to
utilize alternative sentencing to incarceration for nonviolent offenders
during the first half of the year. MININTER granted conditional release
to 1,421 prisoners in May. The law provides for an ombudsman who has
the power to carry out investigations of prisons. The ombudsman also
receives and examines complaints from individuals and independent
associations relating to civil servants, state organs, and private
institutions. Prisoners and detainees had weekly access to visitors and
were permitted religious observance. Prison staff held regular meetings
with prisoners and detainees to listen to inmates’ complaints and take
action to resolve them when possible. The MININTER permanent secretary
personally inspected all prisons and took steps to hire staff for a
human rights inspectorate within the ministry. The chief of defense
staff supervised detention reform efforts in MINADEF.

Monitoring: The government permitted independent monitoring of
prison conditions by diplomats, as well as the International Committee
of the Red Cross, which reported unimpeded access on an unannounced
basis to all the prisons, police stations, and military facilities that
it visited during the year. HRW obtained access to visit prisons, but
the government repeatedly blocked access to individual prisoners and
subsequently ruled HRW did not have the right to request access to
individual prisoners. Amnesty International was unable to visit prisons
due to government delays in permit approval. Journalists may access
prisons with a valid press card but must request permission from the RCS
commissioner to interview or take photos. The government did not permit
independent monitoring of safe houses. It also denied local human
rights NGOs, including LIPRODHOR and the Youth Association for Human
Rights Promotion and Development (AJPRODHO-JIJUKIRWA), permits to visit
prisons and police detention centers.
Improvements: There were continued improvements in treatment
of the general prison population. Overcrowding in prisons continued to
decline. MININTER took full responsibility to provide food for
prisoners. Unannounced quarterly inspections by the MININTER permanent
secretary led to improved recordkeeping and treatment of prisoners in
RCS facilities, while periodic monitoring by the MINADEF chief of
defense staff led to a reduction in reported abuses at military
detention facilities. Under the RCS Strategic Plan 2012-17, RCS
undertook renovations of some of the 14 existing prison facilities and
began construction of Butamwa Prison, which will replace Kigali Central
“1930” Prison upon completion. As part of a shift to rehabilitative
detention, RCS had 2,848 regular prisoners and 650 TIG camp prisoners in
vocational training programs at year’s end. Also, 4,432 regular
prisoners and 849 TIG camp prisoners were participating in literacy and
language education. RCS established a psychosocial center for children
under the age of three who lived with their parents in prison. All
juvenile cases were recorded and submitted to MINIJUST and other
government institutions on a quarterly basis, and increased efforts were
made to provide juveniles legal assistance through Legal Aid Week.