[Since 1994, the world witnesses the horrifying Tutsi minority (14%) ethnic domination, the Tutsi minority ethnic rule with an iron hand, tyranny and corruption in Rwanda. The current government has been characterized by the total impunity of RPF criminals, the Tutsi economic monopoly, the Tutsi militaristic domination, and the brutal suppression of the rights of the majority of the Rwandan people (85% are Hutus)and mass arrests of Hutus by the RPF criminal organization =>AS International]
Rwanda is often said to have enjoyed
exceptional relations with aid donors since the 1994 genocide, due to guilt
from foreign governments’ inaction. By looking at two aid donors, Canada and
the Netherlands, this claim is shown to be more complicated, drawing attention
to the complex drivers behind relations with Rwanda and authoritarian aidrecipients more broadly.
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s recent trip to
Africa stirred criticism for the hobnobbing with authoritarian leaders it
entailed, some with rather unsavory human rights records. The trip, designed to
bolster support for a Canadian seat on the UN Security Council, raised once
again a key international conundrum: how do we conduct diplomacy and
development cooperation in a world where authoritarianism is a norm? And at
what costs?
Africa stirred criticism for the hobnobbing with authoritarian leaders it
entailed, some with rather unsavory human rights records. The trip, designed to
bolster support for a Canadian seat on the UN Security Council, raised once
again a key international conundrum: how do we conduct diplomacy and
development cooperation in a world where authoritarianism is a norm? And at
what costs?
When we mapped post-genocide Rwanda’s aid relations for an
article in African Affairs, this was not the puzzle that animated us. But given the
entrenchment of authoritarianism in Rwanda over the last few decades, our work
eventually led us to reflect on how the donor community engages with
authoritarian partners, and more broadly on how scholars of African politics
often misunderstand these dynamics.
article in African Affairs, this was not the puzzle that animated us. But given the
entrenchment of authoritarianism in Rwanda over the last few decades, our work
eventually led us to reflect on how the donor community engages with
authoritarian partners, and more broadly on how scholars of African politics
often misunderstand these dynamics.
‘Genocide credit’
Authoritarianism was part of what we aimed to study only
inasmuch as it forms part of the ‘genocide credit’ of which Rwanda-watchers
often assume the country benefits. That is, the international donor community
is willing to give more and criticise less in Rwanda, because it felt/feels
guilty for abandoning the country during the 1994 genocide. This idea is reinforced
by media portrayals of contrite foreign leaders at genocide
commemorations.
It is also encouraged by the Rwandan government itself, which has played the guilt card with the international community to shame and deflect
criticism of its human rights record.
inasmuch as it forms part of the ‘genocide credit’ of which Rwanda-watchers
often assume the country benefits. That is, the international donor community
is willing to give more and criticise less in Rwanda, because it felt/feels
guilty for abandoning the country during the 1994 genocide. This idea is reinforced
by media portrayals of contrite foreign leaders at genocide
commemorations.
It is also encouraged by the Rwandan government itself, which has played the guilt card with the international community to shame and deflect
criticism of its human rights record.
We set out to test the ‘genocide credit’, and what we
found was something more complicated. Rather than being an exceptionally
spoiled recipient, Rwanda fares much like countries already part of favored
groups. Canadian and Dutch officials we spoke with also consistently stressed
their awareness of Rwanda’s political transgressions, including early on after
the genocide. But political, bureaucratic and idiosyncratic agendas – rather
than guilt – amounted to an incoherent approach, including regarding Rwanda’s
growing authoritarianism.
found was something more complicated. Rather than being an exceptionally
spoiled recipient, Rwanda fares much like countries already part of favored
groups. Canadian and Dutch officials we spoke with also consistently stressed
their awareness of Rwanda’s political transgressions, including early on after
the genocide. But political, bureaucratic and idiosyncratic agendas – rather
than guilt – amounted to an incoherent approach, including regarding Rwanda’s
growing authoritarianism.
Impressive amounts of aid?
When compared to developing countries worldwide,
post-genocide Rwanda receives impressive amounts of aid. But this was also true
before the genocide. More importantly, when compared to recipient countries in
aid priority groups, Rwanda receives average amounts of development aid.
Between 1995 and 2017, the sums were on par with other countries participating
in the World Bank and IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
It also received aid amounts on par with other countries classified by development
institutions as ‘fragile and conflict-affected’. Rwanda is not exceptional
among the exceptional.
post-genocide Rwanda receives impressive amounts of aid. But this was also true
before the genocide. More importantly, when compared to recipient countries in
aid priority groups, Rwanda receives average amounts of development aid.
Between 1995 and 2017, the sums were on par with other countries participating
in the World Bank and IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
It also received aid amounts on par with other countries classified by development
institutions as ‘fragile and conflict-affected’. Rwanda is not exceptional
among the exceptional.
But the ‘genocide credit’ also tells the story of the
donor community turning a blind eye to Rwanda’s transgressions, with some of
the worst taking place in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. We found that Rwanda’s recent aid relations are best
understood as comprising two periods: from the genocide to 2000, and from the
2000s to today. For both periods, respondents consistently told us that their
government was aware of Rwandan political transgressions. Most of the time they
nonetheless chose to prioritize access to the government.
donor community turning a blind eye to Rwanda’s transgressions, with some of
the worst taking place in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. We found that Rwanda’s recent aid relations are best
understood as comprising two periods: from the genocide to 2000, and from the
2000s to today. For both periods, respondents consistently told us that their
government was aware of Rwandan political transgressions. Most of the time they
nonetheless chose to prioritize access to the government.
During the emergency period, unsurprisingly, needs drove
aid. Large volumes were disbursed quickly and very informally. The period from
2001 onwards is characterized by a ‘return to normality’. Humanitarian aid
decreased and standard operating procedures kicked in. According to
interviewees, aid relations were even quite banal at times following 2001.
aid. Large volumes were disbursed quickly and very informally. The period from
2001 onwards is characterized by a ‘return to normality’. Humanitarian aid
decreased and standard operating procedures kicked in. According to
interviewees, aid relations were even quite banal at times following 2001.
That said, most interviewees stressed their knowledge of
the authoritarian context in Rwanda. Canadian actors felt they needed to get
creative to address governance issues in ‘non-frontal’ ways in order to
continue their work on the ground. The Dutch, meanwhile, at times resorted to
more frontal engagement, including aid suspensions, but nonetheless increased
their involvement in Rwanda over time.
the authoritarian context in Rwanda. Canadian actors felt they needed to get
creative to address governance issues in ‘non-frontal’ ways in order to
continue their work on the ground. The Dutch, meanwhile, at times resorted to
more frontal engagement, including aid suspensions, but nonetheless increased
their involvement in Rwanda over time.
The drivers of bilateral relations
Our research suggests guilt was never the main driver of
these bilateral relations. Aid to Rwanda is, and always has been, influenced by
a complicated set of motives – many of them idiosyncratic. The emergency
period, because of its reactive nature, allowed much greater space for personal
and political agendas in decision-making regarding Rwanda. This is illustrated
by Minister of Development Cooperation Jan Pronk’s imprint on the Dutch-Rwandan relations. When bureaucratic management kicked back, Rwanda’s
performance as an aid partner certainly factored in, but in large part
reflected Canadian, Dutch and international interest in more effective aid
partnerships. Key decisions were driven by keeping up the work in Rwanda, as
much as they were determined by domestic pressures from Ottawa and The Hague.
these bilateral relations. Aid to Rwanda is, and always has been, influenced by
a complicated set of motives – many of them idiosyncratic. The emergency
period, because of its reactive nature, allowed much greater space for personal
and political agendas in decision-making regarding Rwanda. This is illustrated
by Minister of Development Cooperation Jan Pronk’s imprint on the Dutch-Rwandan relations. When bureaucratic management kicked back, Rwanda’s
performance as an aid partner certainly factored in, but in large part
reflected Canadian, Dutch and international interest in more effective aid
partnerships. Key decisions were driven by keeping up the work in Rwanda, as
much as they were determined by domestic pressures from Ottawa and The Hague.
Canada ended formal bilateral aid relations with Rwanda in
2012. But this decision came about due to a much larger re-organization of
Canada’s aid programme. For the Dutch, aid suspensions were as much a
reflection of pressure from domestic lobbying groups as they were a ‘moral
stance’. Political, idiosyncratic, domestic – and dare we say short-term –
pressures have always factored into aid relations. Decades of aid to Rwanda
never amounted to a coherent approach, despite the country’s growing
authoritarianism, largely because it was never solely about Rwanda.
2012. But this decision came about due to a much larger re-organization of
Canada’s aid programme. For the Dutch, aid suspensions were as much a
reflection of pressure from domestic lobbying groups as they were a ‘moral
stance’. Political, idiosyncratic, domestic – and dare we say short-term –
pressures have always factored into aid relations. Decades of aid to Rwanda
never amounted to a coherent approach, despite the country’s growing
authoritarianism, largely because it was never solely about Rwanda.
Balancing access, aid delivery and
pressures
As we explored the ‘genocide credit’, we eventually
concluded that this ‘credit’ is not only the story of the ongoing ‘balancing’ –
in their words – bilateral donors undertake to maintain access and navigate
multiple levels of pressures (bureaucratic, domestic, international). The
genocide credit story is also revealing of how, as academics, we often fail to
understand the concrete realities of aid delivery. Given Rwanda’s exceptional
history of violence, academics often assume that patterns of aid giving to
Rwanda are unique. However, looking only at Rwanda ignores aid giving’s broader
patterns.
concluded that this ‘credit’ is not only the story of the ongoing ‘balancing’ –
in their words – bilateral donors undertake to maintain access and navigate
multiple levels of pressures (bureaucratic, domestic, international). The
genocide credit story is also revealing of how, as academics, we often fail to
understand the concrete realities of aid delivery. Given Rwanda’s exceptional
history of violence, academics often assume that patterns of aid giving to
Rwanda are unique. However, looking only at Rwanda ignores aid giving’s broader
patterns.
Donors never operate on single motives and are rarely
well-oiled machines. There is often a very human and idiosyncratic side to the
story of aid giving. Just as importantly, practitioners are often balancing
access and the continuation of their work in-country with security and
governance issues. Their lack of frontal engagement with governance and human
rights is not a sign that they ignore political transgressions. Rather it is a
common belief amongst practitioners that this is a necessary part of the job.
well-oiled machines. There is often a very human and idiosyncratic side to the
story of aid giving. Just as importantly, practitioners are often balancing
access and the continuation of their work in-country with security and
governance issues. Their lack of frontal engagement with governance and human
rights is not a sign that they ignore political transgressions. Rather it is a
common belief amongst practitioners that this is a necessary part of the job.
To be clear, we are not arguing that academics should
accept this position as the ‘right’ one. We are suggesting that academics
should be aware of this reality. From here, they can better reflect with
practitioners about the long-term costs of ‘balancing’, especially in
authoritarian settings.
accept this position as the ‘right’ one. We are suggesting that academics
should be aware of this reality. From here, they can better reflect with
practitioners about the long-term costs of ‘balancing’, especially in
authoritarian settings.
Indeed, one key takeaway from decades of aid in Rwanda is
that over the long-run continued ‘balancing’ helps enshrine authoritarianism, further
limiting donors’ ability to constructively engage their partner on political
governance matters. So how do we continue to engage with challenging partners,
especially authoritarian ones, in ways that do not contribute to further
authoritarian enshrinement?
that over the long-run continued ‘balancing’ helps enshrine authoritarianism, further
limiting donors’ ability to constructively engage their partner on political
governance matters. So how do we continue to engage with challenging partners,
especially authoritarian ones, in ways that do not contribute to further
authoritarian enshrinement?
Academic expectations of direct forms of confrontation –
or naked criticism of instances when donors do not confront – do not help us
answer this question. We need to understand the complex, and sometimes
idiosyncratic and short-term; strategies and motives practitioners deploy in
order to help develop alternative forms of operating. We should not be
surprised by Canada’s visit to Africa and some of the uncomfortable hobnobbing
it gave rise to. We should instead aim to foster a dialogue on how we engage
authoritarianism with eyes wide open to long-term impacts.
or naked criticism of instances when donors do not confront – do not help us
answer this question. We need to understand the complex, and sometimes
idiosyncratic and short-term; strategies and motives practitioners deploy in
order to help develop alternative forms of operating. We should not be
surprised by Canada’s visit to Africa and some of the uncomfortable hobnobbing
it gave rise to. We should instead aim to foster a dialogue on how we engage
authoritarianism with eyes wide open to long-term impacts.
Photo: ‘UN Women launches HeForShe
IMPACT 10x10x10 Initiative’ by UN Photo/Mark Garten is licensed under
creative commons (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
IMPACT 10x10x10 Initiative’ by UN Photo/Mark Garten is licensed under
creative commons (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
About the Author
 |
Marie-Eve Desrosiers
|
Marie-Eve
Desrosiers is associate professor in the School of International Development
and Global Studies, University of Ottawa. She is chairholder of the
International Francophonie Chair on political aspirations and movements in
Francophone Africa. Her research focuses on the security of developing countries.
She tweets @DesrosiersME
Desrosiers is associate professor in the School of International Development
and Global Studies, University of Ottawa. She is chairholder of the
International Francophonie Chair on political aspirations and movements in
Francophone Africa. Her research focuses on the security of developing countries.
She tweets @DesrosiersME
 |
Haley J. Swedlund |
Haley J. Swedlund is an Assistant Professor at the Centre
for International Conflict and Management (CICAM), Department of Political
Science at Radboud University. She tweets @hjswedlund
Posted In: Development |
International Affairs
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a “time”, yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a time, yet It cannot be destroyed => Wolverine
