Fighting from a
distance, the template of the Arab Spring
distance, the template of the Arab Spring
Rwandan exiles and immigrants around the world should play a crucial
role in the upcoming revolution against Kagame and his dictatorship established
in Rwanda. We actively ask the overseas and Europe to arm the opposition to
help return our country Rwanda to democracy.
Resistance and
activism of the Rwandan men and women are becoming a must.
activism of the Rwandan men and women are becoming a must.
This article is
dedicated to the Rwandan activists and political opponents whose actions are
converging against the Kagame regime and RPF dictatorship. We publish it in the
hope it will provoque some critical self-reflection among those who need it.
dedicated to the Rwandan activists and political opponents whose actions are
converging against the Kagame regime and RPF dictatorship. We publish it in the
hope it will provoque some critical self-reflection among those who need it.
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. Adopted by the International
Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950.
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. Adopted by the International
Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950.
Introductory
note: Under General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), paragraph (a), the
International Law Commission was directed to “formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the judgment of the Tribunal.” In the course of the consideration of this
subject, the question arose as to whether or not the Commission should
ascertain to what extent the principles contained in the Charter and judgment
constituted principles of international law. The conclusion was that since the
Nuremberg Principles had been affirmed by the General Assembly, the task
entrusted to the Commission was not to express any appreciation of these
principles as principles of international law but merely to formulate them. The
text below was adopted by the Commission at its second session. The Report of
the Commission also contains commentaries on the principles (see Yearbook of
the Intemational Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 374-378).
note: Under General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), paragraph (a), the
International Law Commission was directed to “formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the judgment of the Tribunal.” In the course of the consideration of this
subject, the question arose as to whether or not the Commission should
ascertain to what extent the principles contained in the Charter and judgment
constituted principles of international law. The conclusion was that since the
Nuremberg Principles had been affirmed by the General Assembly, the task
entrusted to the Commission was not to express any appreciation of these
principles as principles of international law but merely to formulate them. The
text below was adopted by the Commission at its second session. The Report of
the Commission also contains commentaries on the principles (see Yearbook of
the Intemational Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 374-378).
Authentic text: English
Text published in Report of the International Law Commission Covering its
Second Session, 5 June-29 Duly 1950, Document A/1316, pp. 11-14.
Text published in Report of the International Law Commission Covering its
Second Session, 5 June-29 Duly 1950, Document A/1316, pp. 11-14.
Principle I
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
Principle II
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person
who committed the act from responsibility under international law.
Principle III
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government
official does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law.
Principle IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
Principle V
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
Principle Vl
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under; international law:
- Crimes against peace:
- Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances; - Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
- Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression
- War crimes:
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity. - Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such
persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any
crime against peace or any war crime.
Principle VII
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime under
international law.
A
Duty to Disobey All Unlawful Orders
Duty to Disobey All Unlawful Orders
The Tutsi RPF
organization, RDF, Abakada (Local defence forces), Directorate
of Military Intelligence
and others , Kagame’s special advisor/sponsors,
IBUKA, and other RPF suborganizations need to know and bear in mind as
they are given orders from General Paul Kagame, the Rwandan dictator’s administration.
organization, RDF, Abakada (Local defence forces), Directorate
of Military Intelligence
and others , Kagame’s special advisor/sponsors,
IBUKA, and other RPF suborganizations need to know and bear in mind as
they are given orders from General Paul Kagame, the Rwandan dictator’s administration.
Among the international Laws and treaties we mention:
- The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide; December 9, 1948, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the
UN General Assembly. - The above mentioned Nuremberg Principles, which define
as a crime against peace, “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
accomplishment of any of the forgoing.”
The “principles of international law recognized in the
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal” adopted
by the Commission in 1950 begin logically with that of individual criminal
responsibility under international law. Principle I is essentially based on the
IMT judgment which states that “crimes against international law are committed
by men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced” (IMT Judgment,
p. 41).
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal” adopted
by the Commission in 1950 begin logically with that of individual criminal
responsibility under international law. Principle I is essentially based on the
IMT judgment which states that “crimes against international law are committed
by men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced” (IMT Judgment,
p. 41).
Principle II states that criminal liability exists
under international law even if domestic law does not punish an act which is an
international crime. This principle is considered to be a corollary to
Principle I. The idea contained in Principle II was already set out in article
6 (c) of the Nürnberg Charter, concerning crimes against humanity – defined as
certain categories of acts “whether or not [such acts were committed] in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”. In its
judgment, the IMT held that “the very essence of the Charter is that
individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations
of obedience imposed by the individual state” (IMT Judgment, p. 42).
under international law even if domestic law does not punish an act which is an
international crime. This principle is considered to be a corollary to
Principle I. The idea contained in Principle II was already set out in article
6 (c) of the Nürnberg Charter, concerning crimes against humanity – defined as
certain categories of acts “whether or not [such acts were committed] in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”. In its
judgment, the IMT held that “the very essence of the Charter is that
individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations
of obedience imposed by the individual state” (IMT Judgment, p. 42).
Principle III affirms the denial of immunity for
individuals who acted “as Head of State or responsible Government officials”.
This principle is based on article 7 of the IMT Charter. The abolition of the
‘Act of State’ doctrine was also reaffirmed by the IMT: “The principle of international
law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a
state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by
international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind
their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings”. Further, the IMT added that: “He who violates the laws of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state
if the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law” (IMT Judgment, p. 42).
individuals who acted “as Head of State or responsible Government officials”.
This principle is based on article 7 of the IMT Charter. The abolition of the
‘Act of State’ doctrine was also reaffirmed by the IMT: “The principle of international
law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a
state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by
international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind
their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings”. Further, the IMT added that: “He who violates the laws of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state
if the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law” (IMT Judgment, p. 42).
Pursuant to Principle IV, “The fact that a person
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him
from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in
fact possible to him.” This idea was already contained in article 8 of the IMT
Charter. However, the substance of the two texts is slightly different.
Firstly, the Commission added the element of the “moral choice” developed in
the IMT judgment. Secondly, the Commission did not retain the last phrase of
article 8 according to which acting under superior orders “may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires”;
indeed, the Commission considered that “the question of mitigating punishment
is a matter for the competent Court to decide” (see Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
1950, vol. II, paras. 104
and 106).
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him
from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in
fact possible to him.” This idea was already contained in article 8 of the IMT
Charter. However, the substance of the two texts is slightly different.
Firstly, the Commission added the element of the “moral choice” developed in
the IMT judgment. Secondly, the Commission did not retain the last phrase of
article 8 according to which acting under superior orders “may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires”;
indeed, the Commission considered that “the question of mitigating punishment
is a matter for the competent Court to decide” (see Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
1950, vol. II, paras. 104
and 106).
The right to a fair trial is laid down in Principle V.
This right was already defined and developed in chapter four of the IMT Charter
entitled “Fair Trial for Defendants”. According to the Commission, the
expression “fair trial” should be understood in light of the provisions of the
IMT Charter (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 109).
This right was already defined and developed in chapter four of the IMT Charter
entitled “Fair Trial for Defendants”. According to the Commission, the
expression “fair trial” should be understood in light of the provisions of the
IMT Charter (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 109).
Principle VI codifies the three categories of crimes
established by article 6 of the IMT Charter (crimes against peace, war crimes
and crimes against humanity). Crimes against peace are defined in Principle VI
(a) as “(i) planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression or
a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii)
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the acts mentioned under (i)”. Neither the IMT Charter or judgment, nor the
Commission gave a definition of the “war of aggression”. The IMT considered
that certain defendants had “planned and waged aggressive wars against twelve
nations, and were therefore guilty of this series of crimes”.
established by article 6 of the IMT Charter (crimes against peace, war crimes
and crimes against humanity). Crimes against peace are defined in Principle VI
(a) as “(i) planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression or
a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii)
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the acts mentioned under (i)”. Neither the IMT Charter or judgment, nor the
Commission gave a definition of the “war of aggression”. The IMT considered
that certain defendants had “planned and waged aggressive wars against twelve
nations, and were therefore guilty of this series of crimes”.
The IMT thus
considered it “unnecessary to discuss the subject in further detail, or even to
consider at any length the extent to which these aggressive wars were also
“wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances” (IMT
Judgment, p. 36). Following the IMT judgment, the Commission, in its
commentary, emphasized that the waging of a war of aggression could be
committed only by “high ranking military personnel and high state officials” (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 117). As for war crimes, Principle
VI (b) repeats the text of article 6 (b) of the IMT Charter with the formula
that war crimes are “violations of the laws and customs of war”. With respect
to crimes against humanity, Principle VI (c) also closely follows the IMT
Statute (art. 6 (c)), by only proscribing crimes against humanity “carried on
in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or war crime”.
The formulation is, however, slightly different in that Principle VI (c)
removes the phrase “before or during the war”.
considered it “unnecessary to discuss the subject in further detail, or even to
consider at any length the extent to which these aggressive wars were also
“wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances” (IMT
Judgment, p. 36). Following the IMT judgment, the Commission, in its
commentary, emphasized that the waging of a war of aggression could be
committed only by “high ranking military personnel and high state officials” (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 117). As for war crimes, Principle
VI (b) repeats the text of article 6 (b) of the IMT Charter with the formula
that war crimes are “violations of the laws and customs of war”. With respect
to crimes against humanity, Principle VI (c) also closely follows the IMT
Statute (art. 6 (c)), by only proscribing crimes against humanity “carried on
in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or war crime”.
The formulation is, however, slightly different in that Principle VI (c)
removes the phrase “before or during the war”.
The Commission considered that
the phrase contained in article 6 referred to a particular war, the war of
1939. However, the “omission of the phrase does not mean that the Commission
considers that crimes against humanity can be committed only during a war. On
the contrary, the Commission is of the opinion that such crimes may take place
also before a war in connection with crimes of peace” (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 123). It is interesting to note
that the link between crimes against humanity and crimes against peace and war
crimes was later deleted by the Commission when it adopted the draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1996 (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 48; see also Control
Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945; art. 1 (b) of the 1968 Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, which did not require the link; and ICTY, Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para.
141).
the phrase contained in article 6 referred to a particular war, the war of
1939. However, the “omission of the phrase does not mean that the Commission
considers that crimes against humanity can be committed only during a war. On
the contrary, the Commission is of the opinion that such crimes may take place
also before a war in connection with crimes of peace” (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 123). It is interesting to note
that the link between crimes against humanity and crimes against peace and war
crimes was later deleted by the Commission when it adopted the draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1996 (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 48; see also Control
Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945; art. 1 (b) of the 1968 Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, which did not require the link; and ICTY, Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para.
141).
Finally, Principle VII states that “complicity in the
commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity
as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.” It is
surprising that this principle only retains complicity without explicitly
mentioning other modes of responsibility such as planning, instigating, or
ordering; nor does the principle include responsibility by omission (so-called
“command responsibility”). It is not clear from the commentary of the
Commission what modes of responsibility “complicity” entailed at the time
(Robert Cryer, Prosecuting
International Crimes, Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime,
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 311). The IMT Charter provided under
article 6 that “leaders, organizers and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy […] are responsible for
all acts performed by any persons in execution of such a plan”. This was
complemented – with regard to crimes against peace only – by article 6 (a)
which stated that liability existed for the “participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of [crimes against peace]”.
commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity
as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.” It is
surprising that this principle only retains complicity without explicitly
mentioning other modes of responsibility such as planning, instigating, or
ordering; nor does the principle include responsibility by omission (so-called
“command responsibility”). It is not clear from the commentary of the
Commission what modes of responsibility “complicity” entailed at the time
(Robert Cryer, Prosecuting
International Crimes, Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime,
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 311). The IMT Charter provided under
article 6 that “leaders, organizers and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy […] are responsible for
all acts performed by any persons in execution of such a plan”. This was
complemented – with regard to crimes against peace only – by article 6 (a)
which stated that liability existed for the “participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of [crimes against peace]”.
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a “time”, yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a time, yet It cannot be destroyed => Wolverine
